Scandinavia - State of Israel News

How Norway Could Be Attacked by Russia

“It’s more likely that there will be an attack and a war than not,” says a lieutenant colonel and researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy. A Ukrainian report warns of major Norwegian vulnerabilities.

Øystein Windstad
Journalist
Published September 29, 2026 - 6:00 a.m. Last updated September 29, 2026 - 8:56 a.m.
Short version

Ukrainian think tank warns Norway of inadequate defenses against missiles and drones

Researcher and lieutenant colonel believe an attack on Norway is likely

Norwegian oil and gas are identified as Russian targets

Lieutenant colonel says Norwegian brigades would last a maximum of two weeks in combat today.

“Norway’s plans for rearmament and defense take a long time, compared to what Russia is capable of right now,” Polina Istomina tells Forsvarets forum.

She represents the Ukrainian think tank and analysis center, the Sahaidachnyi Security Center.

They have produced the report The Battle of Norway, in which they examine the Russian strategies and methods used against Ukraine.

Based on this, the think tank highlights what Norway can expect if Putin were to launch an attack.
PHOTO: Polina Istomina of the Sahaidachnyi Security Center advises Norway to mass-produce drones, among other things. Photo: Gregory Vepryk

The report warns of major gaps and weaknesses in Norway’s defenses against the Russian war machine. Istomina warns that it will take several years before Norway and other European countries are fully rearmed.
Will Cut Off the Power

Trygve Smidt is a lieutenant colonel and researcher affiliated with the Norwegian Military Academy. He has read the report and says the Ukrainian assessment of Norway is sound.

“I think they’ve hit the mark pretty well in their analysis of Norway’s vulnerabilities,” Smidt tells Forsvarets forum.

Both the Ukrainian think tank Sahaidachnyi Security Center and Smidt believe the most likely scenario is that Russia will target Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

RESEARCHER: Trygve Smidt is a retired lieutenant colonel and a researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy, where his work focuses, among other things, on Russia’s conduct of war in Ukraine. Photo: Øystein Windstad, Forsvarets forum

“If Russia attacks the Baltic countries, the Russians will simultaneously strike where it hurts the most. That is Norwegian oil and gas—primarily gas supplies to Europe. It is highly likely that Russia will seek to sabotage and attack this infrastructure so that, among other things, they can undermine Europe’s ability to supply electricity,” says the lieutenant colonel, continuing:

“Norway is a very important supplier of energy to Europe. Last year, 33 percent of the gas consumed by the EU and the United Kingdom came from Norway. The gas we export amounts to 1,270 terawatt-hours, which is nine times Norway’s electricity consumption,” says Smidt.

He describes Norway’s undersea infrastructure as very vulnerable and points out that there are nearly 900 mil of Norwegian gas pipelines on the seabed.

Russia could attack Norway with these

The overview below shows the missiles Russia most frequently uses against Ukraine and that could be used against Norway in a conflict.

Iskander – a ballistic missile with a range of 500 km and a warhead weighing up to 700 kg.

Kh-101 “Kodiak” – cruise missile with a range of 3,500 km and a 400 kg warhead.

RM-48U – ballistic missile with a range of 400 km and a 200 kg warhead

Kh-59/Kh-69 – cruise missile with a range of 115 km and a 300 kg warhead.

Kalibr – cruise missile with a range of 2,500 km and a 450 kg warhead.

Geran-2 – a propeller-driven, low-cost drone with a range of 2,500 km and a 50 kg warhead.

Geran-3 – a jet-powered, faster drone with a range of 1,000 km and a 50 kg warhead.

Banderol – a low-cost cruise missile with a range of 500 km and a 150 kg warhead.

Kinzhal – a hypersonic ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 km and a 480 kg warhead.

Norway’s Vulnerability

The report The Battle of Norway points out that Norway has no means of shooting down ballistic missiles. Norway’s defenses against drones and missiles are described as vulnerable. Lieutenant Colonel Smidt agrees.

“Yes, it’s true that we’re defenseless. The report states the facts as they are. This is the information they’ve gathered from open sources,” he says, elaborating.

Facts
Findings from the report on Norway

The report *The Battle of Norway* highlights several challenges facing Norway.

Norway lacks defenses against everything from cheap, mass-produced drones to hypersonic and ballistic missiles.

It is difficult to monitor and protect the thousands of kilometers of undersea cables and gas pipelines.

The Home Guard and the Armed Forces have too few personnel to cover such a large geographic area without extensive automation.

Norway is prepared for traditional warfare involving aircraft, ships, and submarines, not large numbers of drones and cheap autonomous sabotage.

Power plants, ports, air bases, and other critical infrastructure can be attacked without Russia needing to invade with soldiers.

Norway’s military buildup will take time, and many capabilities will not be in place until after 2029.

“We have absolutely no defense against ballistic missiles or hypervelocity missiles. Even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this has not been addressed,” says Smidt. A hypervelocity missile travels even faster than a hypersonic missile and destroys its target with pure kinetic energy, often without a warhead.
Facts
Findings in the Report on Norway

The report *The Battle of Norway* highlights several challenges facing Norway.

Norway lacks defenses against everything from cheap, mass-produced drones to hypersonic and ballistic missiles.

It is difficult to monitor and protect the thousands of kilometers of undersea cables and gas pipelines.

The Home Guard and the Armed Forces have too few personnel to cover such a large geographic area without extensive automation.

Norway is prepared for traditional warfare involving aircraft, ships, and submarines, not large numbers of drones and cheap autonomous sabotage.

Power plants, ports, air bases, and other critical infrastructure can be attacked without Russia needing to invade with soldiers.

Norway’s military buildup is taking time, and many capabilities will not be in place until after 2029.

The lieutenant colonel believes there are many positive developments underway in Norway’s military buildup, but that it is proceeding far too slowly.

“It has been decided that a defense against ballistic missiles will be established at some point in the future. It does not seem as though the political decision-makers have understood the urgency of the threat we face,” he says.

War Is Likely

Smidt has worked for 38 years in operational and administrative roles in the Armed Forces, as well as in the Ministry of Defense. The lieutenant colonel considers it likely that Russia will attack one or more NATO countries—and that this will result in Norway also being attacked.

“The danger is very real. Russia has, after all, a stated goal of reestablishing its sphere of influence, as it had during the Soviet era. So their goal is both to secure significantly larger parts of Ukraine and also the Baltic states. That is what they have said, decided, and set in motion,” says Smidt.

In the report The Battle of Norway, the Sahaidachnyi Security Center identifies the next three years as a window of opportunity for Putin. Smidt says that the intelligence agencies of several countries describe the same critical time window.

“The intelligence agencies of many European countries—and now the CIA as well—have acknowledged that it is highly likely an attack will occur at some point between this fall and 2029,” says Smidt.

Among other things, he has written research reports for NUPI and Corisk on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

– How likely do you think it is that the Putin regime will attack a NATO country?

– It is more likely that they will do so than that they will not, says Smidt.
Active Attacks

Smidt says the attacks that have been assessed by intelligence agencies range from cyberattacks to conventional attacks aimed at seizing and holding territory. He points out that Russia is already in motion.

SHOT DOWN: The photo shows the Russian-made Geran 2 drone during a parade in Moscow in 2025. According to Reuters, a drone of this type was shot down over Lithuania on September 15. Photo: Pavel Bednyakov, AP, NTB

“European countries have been attacked hundreds of times since 2022 by Russia, or agents paid by Russia, through cyberattacks and various forms of sabotage. In other words, Russia has crossed the line into actively attacking European countries,” he says, continuing.
Send us a tip!

Do you have tips or input on this or other stories? Send us an email at: [email protected] or contact one of our journalists directly.

“What we’re talking about here, in other words, is the likelihood of an escalation of the ongoing attacks on a larger scale, or with more damaging consequences. This includes a possible major conventional attack against one or more of the Baltic states,” says Smidt.
– Think scale and volume

The Battle of Norway points out that Norway is a large country with a small population. The recommendation in the analysis from the Ukrainian think tank is to focus on automation and AI-driven defense systems where many drones can be controlled by a few operators.

– Don’t wait for perfection; go big. It’s important to understand that war has now become a mass war where things are produced in large quantities and at low cost,” says Istomina, nodding toward Ukraine’s drone initiative, which has helped halt the Russian advance.

TESTING: Polina Istomina of the Sahaidachnyi Security Center says that the most important thing Norway can do is to get started with production: “Don’t be so afraid to try and make a few mistakes. The most important thing is to get started.” Photo: Øystein Windstad, Forsvarets forum

“We have several years of experience resisting Russian occupation. Individuals, society, and our industry possess knowledge that we’re happy to share and contribute,” she says.
Advises a Change of Course

Smidt says that lessons and knowledge from Ukraine must be used to quickly put in place defenses against drones and missiles.

“The biggest gap we have—and one that urgently needs to be addressed—is establishing a missile defense system. This will enable us to mitigate the effects of Russian ballistic missiles, particularly high-velocity missiles,” says the retired lieutenant colonel.

PATRIOT: The photo shows a German Patriot system at an airport. Patriot systems have been effective in intercepting Russian ballistic missiles in Ukraine. Photo: Axel Heimken, AP, NTB

Smidt says that systems are already in place to protect petroleum production, but that additional security measures must be put in place quickly.

“All of our major onshore facilities must be protected from both the air and the ground. We must also protect undersea infrastructure. The 33 percent of the EU’s and the UK’s energy supply cannot be replaced quickly; it will take several years,” says Smidt.
Calls for a paradigm shift

One of the recommendations in The Battle of Norway is that the Home Guard be equipped with drones and drone defense systems to create a nationwide drone shield. Lieutenant Colonel Smidt agrees with this analysis as well.

“The only way to secure sufficient drone defense and drone capacity for the entire country is through the Home Guard. However, this requires a massive expansion of training and education. It will require a complete paradigm shift,” says the researcher.

PROJECT: The photo shows a soldier in the Home Guard in Moss who is participating in a drone test project. Photo: Kaisa Flaten Brekke, Norwegian Armed Forces

The report states that Norway currently has one brigade that is scheduled to be fully equipped by 2030 and two new ones that are to be ready by 2036. The think tank notes that Norway would be dependent on assistance from Finland, Sweden, and other NATO countries should Russia launch a ground invasion of Norway. The Norwegian brigades are planned to have approximately 4,500 personnel.
Recommends a Threefold Increase

Smidt says that if a ground invasion were to occur, the Norwegian brigades would last a maximum of fourteen days as they are currently equipped.

“If we are to be able to fight for more than two weeks with three brigades, we must multiply both personnel and equipment by two to three times what we have today,” he says, continuing:

“It’s simple math. If a brigade is to fight, you must expect between 100 and 150 personnel losses per day. Eighty percent of the losses occur in infantry and armored units. If you lose 100 per day, you can, at best, fight for two weeks before these units are completely wiped out.” “We’d need to triple our numbers to have endurance beyond two weeks,” says Lieutenant Colonel Smidt.

National Security
Believes a NATO Attack Is Likely: These Could Be Russia’s Targets in Norway

A Norwegian defense researcher believes it is more likely than not that Russia will attack a NATO country.

Elias Lund-Olsen
Journalist - Opinion Editor
Published September 30, 2026 - 3:10 p.m. Last updated September 30, 2026 - 3:12 p.m.

A new Ukrainian analysis highlights several weaknesses in Norway’s defense should the conflict between Russia and NATO escalate.

The report “The Battle of Norway,” produced by the Ukrainian think tank Sahaidachnyi Security Center, draws on experiences from the war in Ukraine to examine how Russia could challenge Norway and NATO. Among other things, the report highlights Norway’s missile defense, drone defense, and critical infrastructure as vulnerable areas.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Trygve Smidt, a researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy, believes the report is spot on.

Both Smidt and the Ukrainian think tank point to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as the most likely targets should Russia launch a major conventional attack against NATO, according to Forsvarets forum.

But Norway could also be drawn directly into the conflict.
Three Main Reasons

According to the report, Norway is strategically important to Russia for three main reasons:
Trygve Smidt. Norwegian Armed Forces

Norway is a key supplier of oil and gas to Europe; the country hosts vital undersea communications infrastructure; and Norwegian ports and bases are crucial for receiving and transporting NATO reinforcements onward to the Nordic and Baltic regions.

“If Russia attacks the Baltic countries, the Russians will simultaneously strike where it hurts the most—namely, Norwegian oil and gas, primarily gas supplies to Europe. It is highly likely that Russia will attempt to sabotage and attack this infrastructure so that, among other things, they can disrupt Europe’s ability to supply electricity,” Smidt told the Norwegian Armed Forces Forum.

Last year, Norway accounted for 33 percent of gas consumption in the EU and the United Kingdom, according to Smidt.

Smidt believes the risk of a major conflict between Russia and NATO is significant, and that it is more likely that Russia will attack a NATO country than that it will refrain from doing so.

The report suggests that Norway could be targeted through a combination of missile attacks, drone swarms, cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and sabotage against critical infrastructure.

The authors describe it as a conflict that could unfold in the air, at sea, on the seabed, and in the digital realm, without Russia necessarily attempting to occupy Norwegian territory.

The point is that the goal would be more to undermine Norway’s ability to function and support NATO than to conquer the country.

Warning About a Gap in Norway’s Defense

The Ukrainian report also points to major shortcomings in Norway’s ability to counter missiles and drones.

According to the report, Norway lacks, among other things, defenses against ballistic missiles, even though large areas, power plants, ports, air bases, cables, and gas pipelines need to be protected.

Smidt is particularly concerned about missile defense.

“The biggest gap we have—and one that urgently needs to be addressed—is acquiring a missile defense system,” he says.

He also believes that oil and gas landing facilities and undersea infrastructure must be better secured.

Among other things, the report recommends greater investment in drones, automated systems, and drone defense. At the same time, it points out that Norway is dependent on support from Sweden, Finland, and other NATO countries should the country be subjected to a ground invasion.

1 Like

https://www.globalresearch.ca/lithuania-nato-members-plotting-blockade-kaliningrad/5942120?doing_wp_cron=1790930276.0185918807983398437500

Why Putin Is Threatening Nuclear War If NATO Blocks Kaliningrad

Experts on Russia shed light on the Kremlin’s assessments.

If the world were to erupt into a conflict over Kaliningrad—the small Russian exclave wedged between Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea—there would at least be one silver lining for the survivors to appreciate: It would be darkly humorous and ironic.

Andrew Day

The American Conservative, October 3, 2026.

Kaliningrad—or Königsberg, as the former German city was called before it was conquered by the Soviet Union in 1945—was the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose most enduring contribution to political theory was a lengthy essay on international relations, Toward Perpetual Peace. In the essay, Kant outlines some highly intelligent ideas that governments should implement, not only to end existing hostilities but also to create the political conditions for, well, perpetual peace.

Old Kant published that hopeful essay 231 years ago and would surely have been disturbed and disappointed by this week’s headlines. The most captivating one came from the New York Post: “Moscow threatens nuclear retaliation over a small fortress wedged between U.S. allies, as fears of a clash grow.” (The Post really has a knack for this sort of thing, doesn’t it?)

The Associated Press headline described the latest developments more accurately, albeit less dramatically. “Russia Warns NATO of a Possible Nuclear Response if Kaliningrad Is Cut Off,” it proclaimed.

So, what has made the Russians so upset? Leading experts on Russia told The American Conservative that Moscow attaches deep strategic importance to the exclave and perceives a Western threat to it.

“Kaliningrad provides Russia with yet another warm-water port on the Baltic Sea,” said Thomas Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former White House expert under President George W. Bush. “It also has significant military resources to defend Russia’s interests in the region, including access routes to St. Petersburg.”

Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute noted an even more direct Russian interest: “Russia cares about this because it is internationally recognized Russian national territory,” Lieven said. “Any attack on it or blockade is therefore legally an act of war against the Russian Federation, to which the Russian government must respond or face profound humiliation.”

These are important points that few experts would dispute. But what truly sets Graham and Lieven apart is their ability to see—from Russia’s perspective—a Western threat to Kaliningrad, and to take it seriously. Based on the comments both men made, Russian President Vladimir Putin did not make flippant nuclear threats.

“In some NATO countries, there has been talk of blockading Kaliningrad—that is, isolating the region from the rest of Russia both by land and by sea,” Graham said. “Putin would view a blockade as an act of war against Russia. So he is making sure Europe understands that he will defend Russian territory by any means necessary, which may include nuclear weapons.”

Even before the recent tensions between Russia and the West, Moscow had already been inclined to view Kaliningrad as vulnerable to a NATO attack. “NATO’s expansion into Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland means that Kaliningrad is now surrounded by NATO countries both on land and at sea,” noted Lieven.

(See also Lieven on Double Down News: WE ARE BEING LIED TO: Washington Insider DROPS BOMBSHELL on Ukraine War)

Unfortunately, not all Western experts take such steps to consider the broader perspectives. Consider, for example, a recent article in The Hill, which, at least according to this editor and columnist, actually carried the week’s most disturbing headline: “Kaliningrad Is Just Putin’s Distraction.”

The co-authors—Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet—write that the Kremlin is engaging in “nuclear bluffing” to intimidate the West and divert attention from its own military setbacks in Ukraine. Early in the article, the only context they provide for Moscow’s warnings is a new British TV series called The Wargame, in which the United Kingdom launches retaliatory strikes against Kaliningrad following a Russian attack.

An uncritical reading of their article might give the impression that this TV show was the main reason—perhaps the only one—behind Putin’s threatening rhetoric. But an attentive reader would learn otherwise, as the authors inadvertently shed light on the types of Western behavior that triggered Putin’s warnings.

“Kaliningrad is a hollow shell of what it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they write. “As Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed out earlier this month, ‘There are hardly any [Russian] troops [in the Kaliningrad exclave].’”

But that wasn’t all Sikorski said. Toth and Sweet link to an article in Defense News, whose first sentence reads as follows:

NATO allies may conduct exercises near Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave in an effort to pressure Moscow to weaken its military position in Ukraine and withdraw some of its troops there, said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

It is clear that Sikorski went far beyond simply commenting on Russia’s position of strength in the region. The article emphasizes that he did not recommend “offensive” measures against Kaliningrad, but one can hardly blame Putin for failing to grasp the distinction. In fact, in the relevant quotes, Sikorski recommends that NATO conduct “aggressive” exercises around Kaliningrad and begin treating the exclave as a front in the confrontation between Russia and the West.

Toth and Sweet’s article continues: “Although Kaliningrad remains the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Sea has in practice become a NATO-controlled lake, following Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO.” Kaliningrad, they write, “is highly vulnerable,” and today it houses only nuclear missiles, since conventional forces are deployed in Ukraine.

Thus, “Moscow’s nuclear Doomsday bluff is simply the latest attempt by Putin and his Kremlin cronies to cover up this problem.”

Here, the premises lead to the conclusion only in the sense that they collide violently with it. If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended with nuclear weapons, perhaps Western leaders should not threaten Kaliningrad—and perhaps Western analysts should take Moscow’s repeated warnings more seriously, namely that such threats may be met with a nuclear response.

These analysts should also understand that the Russian political establishment in general—not just Putin—perceives a Western threat to Kaliningrad as one that, if carried out, could trigger a devastating conflict between Russia and NATO. Referring to Sikorski’s apparent suggestion that NATO could isolate the exclave and force it to surrender, Lieven said: “If this happened, every Russian I have spoken with has said that Russia would credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons—and then actually use them—if NATO did not withdraw.”

Tensions between Russia and the West are at their highest since the Cold War, and mutual understanding is perhaps at its lowest. In our time, Kant’s dreams of perpetual peace may seem naive, almost delusional, but our leaders surely have enough wisdom not to let unforgivable misjudgments about his homeland on the Baltic Sea lead to nuclear war. Right?

Bomb Target

Our military leadership plans and uses the civilian population as a shield in areas where their ships and aircraft are most vulnerable. In Harstad, maintenance of the frigates is planned to take place in downtown Harstad. The U.S. submarine base is located in Tromsø. In Bodø, the military airfield is within walking distance of downtown.

Our authorities have turned the three largest cities in the region into legitimate military targets. This raises the question of whether it is the civilian population that is supposed to ensure the military’s safety, or whether the armed forces exist to protect the civilian population.

The war in the Middle East has shown that military bases and infrastructure are the targets of bombing. It became a burden for the Gulf states to host U.S. military bases. We are not made safer by the military presence—quite the opposite. The Russian military force that people warn us about is designed for confrontation with the superpower, the U.S., not with us. But by allowing U.S. bases and the use of our territory, we become a legitimate target and are thus drawn into the rivalry between superpowers that could lead to war. Today’s wars are fought with missiles and bombs.

A dry dock facility is planned in downtown Harstad, right next to a new hotel and a planned high school.

Here, the authorities have let market forces take the lead. There is no comprehensive plan. A real estate company has sold the lot for both hotel operations and the high school without conducting a risk analysis. No bomb shelters are planned for the area.

Harstad Mekaniske Verksted (HAMEK) has itself argued that naval vessels should be maintained here in the city center. In particular, they point to an agreement regarding the maintenance of the new frigates to be built in the United Kingdom. The dry dock facility is intended to strengthen the Armed Forces in the north.

The authorities share responsibility for this task. Opponents have demanded that the workshop industry be moved out of the city center. This would also provide an opportunity to consolidate the workshop operations that are currently spread between the Sama and Sentrum districts. The municipality of Harstad has submitted a request to the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB). They have forwarded the inquiry to the State Administrator.

The authorities do not intervene either when the county government is allowed to build a high school in the floodplain near a military target or when the Armed Forces are allowed to use the civilian population as a shield. According to the Geneva Convention, military targets should, as far as possible, not be located within or near densely populated areas.

A submarine is most vulnerable when it is docked, as in Tromsø. There, they have only assessed the risk of accidents involving the reactors, not the risk of an attack on a nuclear submarine. Airplanes are most vulnerable at the airport; we’ve seen this at U.S. bases in the Middle East. And the frigates are like “sitting ducks” in the HAMEK dock in downtown Harstad.

Frode Bygdnes.