Scandinavia - State of Israel News

How Norway Could Be Attacked by Russia

“It’s more likely that there will be an attack and a war than not,” says a lieutenant colonel and researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy. A Ukrainian report warns of major Norwegian vulnerabilities.

Øystein Windstad
Journalist
Published September 29, 2026 - 6:00 a.m. Last updated September 29, 2026 - 8:56 a.m.
Short version

Ukrainian think tank warns Norway of inadequate defenses against missiles and drones

Researcher and lieutenant colonel believe an attack on Norway is likely

Norwegian oil and gas are identified as Russian targets

Lieutenant colonel says Norwegian brigades would last a maximum of two weeks in combat today.

“Norway’s plans for rearmament and defense take a long time, compared to what Russia is capable of right now,” Polina Istomina tells Forsvarets forum.

She represents the Ukrainian think tank and analysis center, the Sahaidachnyi Security Center.

They have produced the report The Battle of Norway, in which they examine the Russian strategies and methods used against Ukraine.

Based on this, the think tank highlights what Norway can expect if Putin were to launch an attack.
PHOTO: Polina Istomina of the Sahaidachnyi Security Center advises Norway to mass-produce drones, among other things. Photo: Gregory Vepryk

The report warns of major gaps and weaknesses in Norway’s defenses against the Russian war machine. Istomina warns that it will take several years before Norway and other European countries are fully rearmed.
Will Cut Off the Power

Trygve Smidt is a lieutenant colonel and researcher affiliated with the Norwegian Military Academy. He has read the report and says the Ukrainian assessment of Norway is sound.

“I think they’ve hit the mark pretty well in their analysis of Norway’s vulnerabilities,” Smidt tells Forsvarets forum.

Both the Ukrainian think tank Sahaidachnyi Security Center and Smidt believe the most likely scenario is that Russia will target Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

RESEARCHER: Trygve Smidt is a retired lieutenant colonel and a researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy, where his work focuses, among other things, on Russia’s conduct of war in Ukraine. Photo: Øystein Windstad, Forsvarets forum

“If Russia attacks the Baltic countries, the Russians will simultaneously strike where it hurts the most. That is Norwegian oil and gas—primarily gas supplies to Europe. It is highly likely that Russia will seek to sabotage and attack this infrastructure so that, among other things, they can undermine Europe’s ability to supply electricity,” says the lieutenant colonel, continuing:

“Norway is a very important supplier of energy to Europe. Last year, 33 percent of the gas consumed by the EU and the United Kingdom came from Norway. The gas we export amounts to 1,270 terawatt-hours, which is nine times Norway’s electricity consumption,” says Smidt.

He describes Norway’s undersea infrastructure as very vulnerable and points out that there are nearly 900 mil of Norwegian gas pipelines on the seabed.

Russia could attack Norway with these

The overview below shows the missiles Russia most frequently uses against Ukraine and that could be used against Norway in a conflict.

Iskander – a ballistic missile with a range of 500 km and a warhead weighing up to 700 kg.

Kh-101 “Kodiak” – cruise missile with a range of 3,500 km and a 400 kg warhead.

RM-48U – ballistic missile with a range of 400 km and a 200 kg warhead

Kh-59/Kh-69 – cruise missile with a range of 115 km and a 300 kg warhead.

Kalibr – cruise missile with a range of 2,500 km and a 450 kg warhead.

Geran-2 – a propeller-driven, low-cost drone with a range of 2,500 km and a 50 kg warhead.

Geran-3 – a jet-powered, faster drone with a range of 1,000 km and a 50 kg warhead.

Banderol – a low-cost cruise missile with a range of 500 km and a 150 kg warhead.

Kinzhal – a hypersonic ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 km and a 480 kg warhead.

Norway’s Vulnerability

The report The Battle of Norway points out that Norway has no means of shooting down ballistic missiles. Norway’s defenses against drones and missiles are described as vulnerable. Lieutenant Colonel Smidt agrees.

“Yes, it’s true that we’re defenseless. The report states the facts as they are. This is the information they’ve gathered from open sources,” he says, elaborating.

Facts
Findings from the report on Norway

The report *The Battle of Norway* highlights several challenges facing Norway.

Norway lacks defenses against everything from cheap, mass-produced drones to hypersonic and ballistic missiles.

It is difficult to monitor and protect the thousands of kilometers of undersea cables and gas pipelines.

The Home Guard and the Armed Forces have too few personnel to cover such a large geographic area without extensive automation.

Norway is prepared for traditional warfare involving aircraft, ships, and submarines, not large numbers of drones and cheap autonomous sabotage.

Power plants, ports, air bases, and other critical infrastructure can be attacked without Russia needing to invade with soldiers.

Norway’s military buildup will take time, and many capabilities will not be in place until after 2029.

“We have absolutely no defense against ballistic missiles or hypervelocity missiles. Even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this has not been addressed,” says Smidt. A hypervelocity missile travels even faster than a hypersonic missile and destroys its target with pure kinetic energy, often without a warhead.
Facts
Findings in the Report on Norway

The report *The Battle of Norway* highlights several challenges facing Norway.

Norway lacks defenses against everything from cheap, mass-produced drones to hypersonic and ballistic missiles.

It is difficult to monitor and protect the thousands of kilometers of undersea cables and gas pipelines.

The Home Guard and the Armed Forces have too few personnel to cover such a large geographic area without extensive automation.

Norway is prepared for traditional warfare involving aircraft, ships, and submarines, not large numbers of drones and cheap autonomous sabotage.

Power plants, ports, air bases, and other critical infrastructure can be attacked without Russia needing to invade with soldiers.

Norway’s military buildup is taking time, and many capabilities will not be in place until after 2029.

The lieutenant colonel believes there are many positive developments underway in Norway’s military buildup, but that it is proceeding far too slowly.

“It has been decided that a defense against ballistic missiles will be established at some point in the future. It does not seem as though the political decision-makers have understood the urgency of the threat we face,” he says.

War Is Likely

Smidt has worked for 38 years in operational and administrative roles in the Armed Forces, as well as in the Ministry of Defense. The lieutenant colonel considers it likely that Russia will attack one or more NATO countries—and that this will result in Norway also being attacked.

“The danger is very real. Russia has, after all, a stated goal of reestablishing its sphere of influence, as it had during the Soviet era. So their goal is both to secure significantly larger parts of Ukraine and also the Baltic states. That is what they have said, decided, and set in motion,” says Smidt.

In the report The Battle of Norway, the Sahaidachnyi Security Center identifies the next three years as a window of opportunity for Putin. Smidt says that the intelligence agencies of several countries describe the same critical time window.

“The intelligence agencies of many European countries—and now the CIA as well—have acknowledged that it is highly likely an attack will occur at some point between this fall and 2029,” says Smidt.

Among other things, he has written research reports for NUPI and Corisk on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

– How likely do you think it is that the Putin regime will attack a NATO country?

– It is more likely that they will do so than that they will not, says Smidt.
Active Attacks

Smidt says the attacks that have been assessed by intelligence agencies range from cyberattacks to conventional attacks aimed at seizing and holding territory. He points out that Russia is already in motion.

SHOT DOWN: The photo shows the Russian-made Geran 2 drone during a parade in Moscow in 2025. According to Reuters, a drone of this type was shot down over Lithuania on September 15. Photo: Pavel Bednyakov, AP, NTB

“European countries have been attacked hundreds of times since 2022 by Russia, or agents paid by Russia, through cyberattacks and various forms of sabotage. In other words, Russia has crossed the line into actively attacking European countries,” he says, continuing.
Send us a tip!

Do you have tips or input on this or other stories? Send us an email at: [email protected] or contact one of our journalists directly.

“What we’re talking about here, in other words, is the likelihood of an escalation of the ongoing attacks on a larger scale, or with more damaging consequences. This includes a possible major conventional attack against one or more of the Baltic states,” says Smidt.
– Think scale and volume

The Battle of Norway points out that Norway is a large country with a small population. The recommendation in the analysis from the Ukrainian think tank is to focus on automation and AI-driven defense systems where many drones can be controlled by a few operators.

– Don’t wait for perfection; go big. It’s important to understand that war has now become a mass war where things are produced in large quantities and at low cost,” says Istomina, nodding toward Ukraine’s drone initiative, which has helped halt the Russian advance.

TESTING: Polina Istomina of the Sahaidachnyi Security Center says that the most important thing Norway can do is to get started with production: “Don’t be so afraid to try and make a few mistakes. The most important thing is to get started.” Photo: Øystein Windstad, Forsvarets forum

“We have several years of experience resisting Russian occupation. Individuals, society, and our industry possess knowledge that we’re happy to share and contribute,” she says.
Advises a Change of Course

Smidt says that lessons and knowledge from Ukraine must be used to quickly put in place defenses against drones and missiles.

“The biggest gap we have—and one that urgently needs to be addressed—is establishing a missile defense system. This will enable us to mitigate the effects of Russian ballistic missiles, particularly high-velocity missiles,” says the retired lieutenant colonel.

PATRIOT: The photo shows a German Patriot system at an airport. Patriot systems have been effective in intercepting Russian ballistic missiles in Ukraine. Photo: Axel Heimken, AP, NTB

Smidt says that systems are already in place to protect petroleum production, but that additional security measures must be put in place quickly.

“All of our major onshore facilities must be protected from both the air and the ground. We must also protect undersea infrastructure. The 33 percent of the EU’s and the UK’s energy supply cannot be replaced quickly; it will take several years,” says Smidt.
Calls for a paradigm shift

One of the recommendations in The Battle of Norway is that the Home Guard be equipped with drones and drone defense systems to create a nationwide drone shield. Lieutenant Colonel Smidt agrees with this analysis as well.

“The only way to secure sufficient drone defense and drone capacity for the entire country is through the Home Guard. However, this requires a massive expansion of training and education. It will require a complete paradigm shift,” says the researcher.

PROJECT: The photo shows a soldier in the Home Guard in Moss who is participating in a drone test project. Photo: Kaisa Flaten Brekke, Norwegian Armed Forces

The report states that Norway currently has one brigade that is scheduled to be fully equipped by 2030 and two new ones that are to be ready by 2036. The think tank notes that Norway would be dependent on assistance from Finland, Sweden, and other NATO countries should Russia launch a ground invasion of Norway. The Norwegian brigades are planned to have approximately 4,500 personnel.
Recommends a Threefold Increase

Smidt says that if a ground invasion were to occur, the Norwegian brigades would last a maximum of fourteen days as they are currently equipped.

“If we are to be able to fight for more than two weeks with three brigades, we must multiply both personnel and equipment by two to three times what we have today,” he says, continuing:

“It’s simple math. If a brigade is to fight, you must expect between 100 and 150 personnel losses per day. Eighty percent of the losses occur in infantry and armored units. If you lose 100 per day, you can, at best, fight for two weeks before these units are completely wiped out.” “We’d need to triple our numbers to have endurance beyond two weeks,” says Lieutenant Colonel Smidt.

National Security
Believes a NATO Attack Is Likely: These Could Be Russia’s Targets in Norway

A Norwegian defense researcher believes it is more likely than not that Russia will attack a NATO country.

Elias Lund-Olsen
Journalist - Opinion Editor
Published September 30, 2026 - 3:10 p.m. Last updated September 30, 2026 - 3:12 p.m.

A new Ukrainian analysis highlights several weaknesses in Norway’s defense should the conflict between Russia and NATO escalate.

The report “The Battle of Norway,” produced by the Ukrainian think tank Sahaidachnyi Security Center, draws on experiences from the war in Ukraine to examine how Russia could challenge Norway and NATO. Among other things, the report highlights Norway’s missile defense, drone defense, and critical infrastructure as vulnerable areas.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Trygve Smidt, a researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy, believes the report is spot on.

Both Smidt and the Ukrainian think tank point to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as the most likely targets should Russia launch a major conventional attack against NATO, according to Forsvarets forum.

But Norway could also be drawn directly into the conflict.
Three Main Reasons

According to the report, Norway is strategically important to Russia for three main reasons:
Trygve Smidt. Norwegian Armed Forces

Norway is a key supplier of oil and gas to Europe; the country hosts vital undersea communications infrastructure; and Norwegian ports and bases are crucial for receiving and transporting NATO reinforcements onward to the Nordic and Baltic regions.

“If Russia attacks the Baltic countries, the Russians will simultaneously strike where it hurts the most—namely, Norwegian oil and gas, primarily gas supplies to Europe. It is highly likely that Russia will attempt to sabotage and attack this infrastructure so that, among other things, they can disrupt Europe’s ability to supply electricity,” Smidt told the Norwegian Armed Forces Forum.

Last year, Norway accounted for 33 percent of gas consumption in the EU and the United Kingdom, according to Smidt.

Smidt believes the risk of a major conflict between Russia and NATO is significant, and that it is more likely that Russia will attack a NATO country than that it will refrain from doing so.

The report suggests that Norway could be targeted through a combination of missile attacks, drone swarms, cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and sabotage against critical infrastructure.

The authors describe it as a conflict that could unfold in the air, at sea, on the seabed, and in the digital realm, without Russia necessarily attempting to occupy Norwegian territory.

The point is that the goal would be more to undermine Norway’s ability to function and support NATO than to conquer the country.

Warning About a Gap in Norway’s Defense

The Ukrainian report also points to major shortcomings in Norway’s ability to counter missiles and drones.

According to the report, Norway lacks, among other things, defenses against ballistic missiles, even though large areas, power plants, ports, air bases, cables, and gas pipelines need to be protected.

Smidt is particularly concerned about missile defense.

“The biggest gap we have—and one that urgently needs to be addressed—is acquiring a missile defense system,” he says.

He also believes that oil and gas landing facilities and undersea infrastructure must be better secured.

Among other things, the report recommends greater investment in drones, automated systems, and drone defense. At the same time, it points out that Norway is dependent on support from Sweden, Finland, and other NATO countries should the country be subjected to a ground invasion.

1 Like

https://www.globalresearch.ca/lithuania-nato-members-plotting-blockade-kaliningrad/5942120?doing_wp_cron=1790930276.0185918807983398437500

2 Likes
2 Likes

Why Putin Is Threatening Nuclear War If NATO Blocks Kaliningrad

Experts on Russia shed light on the Kremlin’s assessments.

If the world were to erupt into a conflict over Kaliningrad—the small Russian exclave wedged between Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea—there would at least be one silver lining for the survivors to appreciate: It would be darkly humorous and ironic.

Andrew Day

The American Conservative, October 3, 2026.

Kaliningrad—or Königsberg, as the former German city was called before it was conquered by the Soviet Union in 1945—was the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose most enduring contribution to political theory was a lengthy essay on international relations, Toward Perpetual Peace. In the essay, Kant outlines some highly intelligent ideas that governments should implement, not only to end existing hostilities but also to create the political conditions for, well, perpetual peace.

Old Kant published that hopeful essay 231 years ago and would surely have been disturbed and disappointed by this week’s headlines. The most captivating one came from the New York Post: “Moscow threatens nuclear retaliation over a small fortress wedged between U.S. allies, as fears of a clash grow.” (The Post really has a knack for this sort of thing, doesn’t it?)

The Associated Press headline described the latest developments more accurately, albeit less dramatically. “Russia Warns NATO of a Possible Nuclear Response if Kaliningrad Is Cut Off,” it proclaimed.

So, what has made the Russians so upset? Leading experts on Russia told The American Conservative that Moscow attaches deep strategic importance to the exclave and perceives a Western threat to it.

“Kaliningrad provides Russia with yet another warm-water port on the Baltic Sea,” said Thomas Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former White House expert under President George W. Bush. “It also has significant military resources to defend Russia’s interests in the region, including access routes to St. Petersburg.”

Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute noted an even more direct Russian interest: “Russia cares about this because it is internationally recognized Russian national territory,” Lieven said. “Any attack on it or blockade is therefore legally an act of war against the Russian Federation, to which the Russian government must respond or face profound humiliation.”

These are important points that few experts would dispute. But what truly sets Graham and Lieven apart is their ability to see—from Russia’s perspective—a Western threat to Kaliningrad, and to take it seriously. Based on the comments both men made, Russian President Vladimir Putin did not make flippant nuclear threats.

“In some NATO countries, there has been talk of blockading Kaliningrad—that is, isolating the region from the rest of Russia both by land and by sea,” Graham said. “Putin would view a blockade as an act of war against Russia. So he is making sure Europe understands that he will defend Russian territory by any means necessary, which may include nuclear weapons.”

Even before the recent tensions between Russia and the West, Moscow had already been inclined to view Kaliningrad as vulnerable to a NATO attack. “NATO’s expansion into Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland means that Kaliningrad is now surrounded by NATO countries both on land and at sea,” noted Lieven.

(See also Lieven on Double Down News: WE ARE BEING LIED TO: Washington Insider DROPS BOMBSHELL on Ukraine War)

Unfortunately, not all Western experts take such steps to consider the broader perspectives. Consider, for example, a recent article in The Hill, which, at least according to this editor and columnist, actually carried the week’s most disturbing headline: “Kaliningrad Is Just Putin’s Distraction.”

The co-authors—Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet—write that the Kremlin is engaging in “nuclear bluffing” to intimidate the West and divert attention from its own military setbacks in Ukraine. Early in the article, the only context they provide for Moscow’s warnings is a new British TV series called The Wargame, in which the United Kingdom launches retaliatory strikes against Kaliningrad following a Russian attack.

An uncritical reading of their article might give the impression that this TV show was the main reason—perhaps the only one—behind Putin’s threatening rhetoric. But an attentive reader would learn otherwise, as the authors inadvertently shed light on the types of Western behavior that triggered Putin’s warnings.

“Kaliningrad is a hollow shell of what it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they write. “As Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed out earlier this month, ‘There are hardly any [Russian] troops [in the Kaliningrad exclave].’”

But that wasn’t all Sikorski said. Toth and Sweet link to an article in Defense News, whose first sentence reads as follows:

NATO allies may conduct exercises near Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave in an effort to pressure Moscow to weaken its military position in Ukraine and withdraw some of its troops there, said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

It is clear that Sikorski went far beyond simply commenting on Russia’s position of strength in the region. The article emphasizes that he did not recommend “offensive” measures against Kaliningrad, but one can hardly blame Putin for failing to grasp the distinction. In fact, in the relevant quotes, Sikorski recommends that NATO conduct “aggressive” exercises around Kaliningrad and begin treating the exclave as a front in the confrontation between Russia and the West.

Toth and Sweet’s article continues: “Although Kaliningrad remains the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Sea has in practice become a NATO-controlled lake, following Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO.” Kaliningrad, they write, “is highly vulnerable,” and today it houses only nuclear missiles, since conventional forces are deployed in Ukraine.

Thus, “Moscow’s nuclear Doomsday bluff is simply the latest attempt by Putin and his Kremlin cronies to cover up this problem.”

Here, the premises lead to the conclusion only in the sense that they collide violently with it. If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended with nuclear weapons, perhaps Western leaders should not threaten Kaliningrad—and perhaps Western analysts should take Moscow’s repeated warnings more seriously, namely that such threats may be met with a nuclear response.

These analysts should also understand that the Russian political establishment in general—not just Putin—perceives a Western threat to Kaliningrad as one that, if carried out, could trigger a devastating conflict between Russia and NATO. Referring to Sikorski’s apparent suggestion that NATO could isolate the exclave and force it to surrender, Lieven said: “If this happened, every Russian I have spoken with has said that Russia would credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons—and then actually use them—if NATO did not withdraw.”

Tensions between Russia and the West are at their highest since the Cold War, and mutual understanding is perhaps at its lowest. In our time, Kant’s dreams of perpetual peace may seem naive, almost delusional, but our leaders surely have enough wisdom not to let unforgivable misjudgments about his homeland on the Baltic Sea lead to nuclear war. Right?

1 Like

Bomb Target

Our military leadership plans and uses the civilian population as a shield in areas where their ships and aircraft are most vulnerable. In Harstad, maintenance of the frigates is planned to take place in downtown Harstad. The U.S. submarine base is located in Tromsø. In Bodø, the military airfield is within walking distance of downtown.

Our authorities have turned the three largest cities in the region into legitimate military targets. This raises the question of whether it is the civilian population that is supposed to ensure the military’s safety, or whether the armed forces exist to protect the civilian population.

The war in the Middle East has shown that military bases and infrastructure are the targets of bombing. It became a burden for the Gulf states to host U.S. military bases. We are not made safer by the military presence—quite the opposite. The Russian military force that people warn us about is designed for confrontation with the superpower, the U.S., not with us. But by allowing U.S. bases and the use of our territory, we become a legitimate target and are thus drawn into the rivalry between superpowers that could lead to war. Today’s wars are fought with missiles and bombs.

A dry dock facility is planned in downtown Harstad, right next to a new hotel and a planned high school.

Here, the authorities have let market forces take the lead. There is no comprehensive plan. A real estate company has sold the lot for both hotel operations and the high school without conducting a risk analysis. No bomb shelters are planned for the area.

Harstad Mekaniske Verksted (HAMEK) has itself argued that naval vessels should be maintained here in the city center. In particular, they point to an agreement regarding the maintenance of the new frigates to be built in the United Kingdom. The dry dock facility is intended to strengthen the Armed Forces in the north.

The authorities share responsibility for this task. Opponents have demanded that the workshop industry be moved out of the city center. This would also provide an opportunity to consolidate the workshop operations that are currently spread between the Sama and Sentrum districts. The municipality of Harstad has submitted a request to the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB). They have forwarded the inquiry to the State Administrator.

The authorities do not intervene either when the county government is allowed to build a high school in the floodplain near a military target or when the Armed Forces are allowed to use the civilian population as a shield. According to the Geneva Convention, military targets should, as far as possible, not be located within or near densely populated areas.

A submarine is most vulnerable when it is docked, as in Tromsø. There, they have only assessed the risk of accidents involving the reactors, not the risk of an attack on a nuclear submarine. Airplanes are most vulnerable at the airport; we’ve seen this at U.S. bases in the Middle East. And the frigates are like “sitting ducks” in the HAMEK dock in downtown Harstad.

Frode Bygdnes.

1 Like

Estonia Deploys Elite Forces Toward Russia

The tense security situation in Europe is the direct reason why Estonia is now deploying its best soldiers closer to the border with Russia.

“We must start at the border and win the first battles,” says Colonel Tarmo Kundla, commander of Estonia’s 1st Brigade, according to the Financial Times.

The brigade is considered the country’s most important combat-ready unit. It is now set to be permanently relocated from Tapa to Jõhvi, about 50 kilometers from the Russian border.

New facilities are currently being built there to accommodate combat-ready soldiers. In addition, a military base is being built in the border town of Narva that will be able to accommodate up to 1,000 soldiers should a critical situation arise.

Previously, Estonia’s defense strategy was based on the ability to retreat and wage a guerrilla war should Russia attack. Now, the plan is to confront Russian forces right at the border, the moment the first Russian soldier sets foot on Estonian soil.
– Deterrence isn’t working

According to Estonia’s intelligence services, Vladimir Putin is believed to be preparing for a possible future military conflict with Estonia. However, they do not believe this would entail a full-scale war against NATO.

They consider it more likely that Russia will test NATO’s outer borders and see how far they can go before NATO's Article 5 is invoked—that is, one for all, all for one.

The city of Narva, located in the far east of Estonia, is particularly vulnerable. The area has a large Russian-speaking population. Estonian authorities fear a limited attack here.

“Deterrence isn’t working,” a high-ranking Estonian intelligence officer told the Financial Times. He believes the next one to four years could be decisive for the security of the Baltic states.
Can now reach targets in St. Petersburg

Estonia does not have its own fighter jets and is therefore entirely dependent on NATO to protect its airspace. As a result, other NATO countries are making their aircraft available to intercept Russian planes and drones in or near Estonian airspace.

However, the country has signed agreements for the delivery of nine U.S. HIMARS systems equipped with M57 missiles, as well as nine South Korean Chunmoo systems. These can strike targets up to 300 kilometers away. This would bring the major Russian city of St. Petersburg within range.

If a ceasefire or peace agreement were to be established between Ukraine and Russia, it could free up large Russian troop contingents, which could mean more Russian soldiers moving closer to the Baltic states. This is what Estonia and the other Baltic countries fear, and they are now taking steps to be able to respond quickly.

In the meantime, they are building up their defenses and deploying forces capable of confronting the Russians at the border and striking back hard from day one should the worst-case scenario occur.

1 Like

https://www.dn.no/forsvar-og-sikkerhet/kinesisk-eide-leiebiler-filmet-hemmelig-ovelse-lagret-video-av-soldater-og-koder/2-1-2050958?zephr_sso_ott=cxBfW1

Chinese-owned rental cars filmed secret exercise: Stored video of soldiers and codes

During the exercise designed to secure Oslo Airport in a wartime scenario, Home Guard soldiers discovered that Chinese-owned rental cars had recorded video footage of them—and even captured the codes they entered at military gates.

During Exercise Hovedstad in September, Home Guard personnel discovered that the vehicles had a recording function that no one had requested or notified them about. The vehicles continued to be used throughout the exercise due to the limited availability of alternative vehicles.

1 Like

Why did Russia warn NATO that it would use nuclear weapons if Kaliningrad were blockaded ?

Introduction

On September 30, Russia sent a diplomatic note to NATO member countries warning that it is prepared to deploy its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, if the alliance attempts to blockade the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. Russia claimed to have “information that NATO is preparing an air and naval blockade” of the area.

In the note sent to NATO, which Reuters has seen, Moscow accused the alliance of pursuing a “dangerous and reckless course” that posed “a high risk of a direct armed conflict breaking out.” The document stated that this included the possibility of “Russian attacks against decision-making centers in the alliance’s member countries from the very outset.”

“Russia will be ready to use the full arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, to defend its territory should NATO countries make any attempt to isolate the Kaliningrad region from the rest of the country,” the diplomatic note stated.

In its written response, which was also seen by Reuters, NATO stated that the organization is a defense alliance and that none of its “exercises or activities pose a threat to the territory of the Russian Federation.” “We call on the Russian Federation to end its unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We urge the Russian Federation to refrain from increasingly reckless behavior toward allies and to cease its irresponsible rhetoric regarding nuclear weapons,” it added.

When asked whether the risk of nuclear weapons being used against the Baltic countries is now real, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said at a defense conference in Brussels, organized by the TV channel Euronews: “No, it isn’t. Putin knows he can never win (against) NATO, so I don’t take this very seriously.” He added that he “am not allowed to reveal what they sent us, but this is more or less what they reported to the media.” He also called the document “not very useful” and said that Russia should “stop the nuclear threats.”

In addition to this official diplomatic warning, Russian embassies in at least three European countries have reportedly issued statements accusing NATO of escalating tensions through military exercises and planning scenarios involving Kaliningrad.

This overview explains:

:black_small_square: The significance of the note;
:black_small_square: Why Kaliningrad is such a sensitive issue;
:black_small_square: Why Russia has issued a written note at this particular time;
:black_small_square: The basis for Russia’s concerns; and
:black_small_square: The risk of miscalculations.
Is the note significant?

The diplomatic note Russia sent to NATO is both unusual and unprecedented. Although aggressive public rhetoric and verbal nuclear risk-taking from Moscow have become commonplace since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, experts and European security officials view this specific communication as a significant escalation due to the formal, private manner in which it was delivered. Experts on nuclear policy point out that this appears to be the first time Russia has issued a formal, written “non-paper” (a diplomatic term for an informal but official note) explicitly threatening the use of nuclear weapons over Kaliningrad. In addition, high-ranking European defense officials have told Reuters that this is the first time since the Cold War that Russia has used a confidential diplomatic channel to threaten member states so directly.

Why is Kaliningrad such a conflict-ridden region?

Kaliningrad is a militarized Russian exclave, completely separated from the Russian mainland and wedged between the NATO member states of Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea. It is of crucial strategic importance to Moscow, as it serves as the main base for Russia’s Baltic surface fleet and marine infantry, and houses Iskander missile systems with nuclear capability. The city has a population of about 1 million. Kaliningrad, formerly the German city of Königsberg and the capital of East Prussia, became part of the Soviet Union after the Red Army captured it in April 1945 and in the wake of the Allies’ division of East Prussia (between Poland and the Soviet Union) at the end of World War II.

Why issue a memo right now ?The alliance has expanded in the Baltic Sea region, with Finland and Sweden set to become members in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Security analysts point to shifts in the balance of power in the Baltic Sea, which in practice has become what some military experts call a “NATO lake,” leaving the Kaliningrad exclave geographically isolated and highly vulnerable. In May 2026, Lithuania’s foreign minister stated that NATO had to show Moscow that it was capable of “penetrating the small fortress they have built in Kaliningrad” and of destroying Russian air defense and missile bases there—remarks that Russia criticized as “bordering on madness.” Furthermore, NATO conducted unannounced electronic warfare and air operations around the exclave in mid-August 2026—actions that could disrupt Russian radar and navigation—likely prompting Moscow to issue a formal, written threat rather than a standard public statement.

This diplomatic warning also came against a backdrop of rising regional tensions. Poland has recently increased its air defense readiness following several suspected incursions into its airspace and after a NATO fighter jet shot down a Russian drone over central Lithuania on September 15. Danish authorities have reported that a Russian warship fired two warning flares near a Danish military helicopter over the Baltic Sea on September 14. In addition, a British-led joint expeditionary force has also been conducting military exercises (LION PROTECTOR 26) in the Baltic Sea and the High North since mid-August.

Tensions have been steadily rising since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting NATO to take decisive action to strengthen its eastern flank. European countries have been walking a tightrope, supporting Ukraine with weapons, intelligence, and sanctions against Russia, without going so far as to participate directly in the conflict. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, however, has stated that Europe is already “waging war” against Russia. For their part, European governments have accused Moscow of escalating a “hybrid war” on the continent through acts of sabotage and arson. Russia denies this and rejects repeated statements by Western politicians that the country is preparing for a possible military attack on a NATO country.

Are Russia's concerns justified?

There is no publicly available or confirmed intelligence suggesting that NATO is preparing an air or naval blockade of Kaliningrad. NATO spokesperson Allison Hart and Secretary General Mark Rutte have categorically rejected the claims and reaffirmed that NATO is a defensive alliance whose activities are neither directed against nor pose a threat to any part of Russian territory. Russia’s claims of an impending blockade, however, may stem from a combination of Western media war games, NATO military exercises, and readiness capabilities.

A triggering factor for the recent increase in Russian diplomatic warnings may have been a fictional program aired by the British TV channel Sky News titled “The Wargame.” The program depicted a hypothetical conflict between Russia and the United Kingdom, in which analysts openly discussed whether to isolate Kaliningrad or refuse to recognize it as a strategic option. The Russian Embassy in London explicitly cited this broadcast as evidence of Western aggression, treating a media simulation as official policy.

Although NATO is not actively seeking to block Kaliningrad, the alliance has contingency plans for various conflict scenarios. In a hypothetical war with Russia, Western military planners acknowledge that Kaliningrad would become a focal point. Should Russia attack a Baltic member state—particularly with the aim of cutting off the Suwałki Corridor (the narrow land border between Poland and Lithuania)—NATO’s plans would naturally involve cutting off and neutralizing the Russian forces stationed in Kaliningrad to protect the alliance’s territory.

In a classic “security dilemma,” it appears that Moscow has interpreted NATO’s description of routine, defensive alliance exercises as “evidence” of an impending offensive blockade. The Russian Embassy in Ireland pointed to joint military exercises conducted by Lithuania, Poland, and France (Gallant Boar 2026) as examples of how the exclave could be isolated, even though NATO maintains that these are defensive exercises intended to protect its eastern flank. As mentioned above, dozens of NATO aircraft carried out an unannounced operation in international airspace near Kaliningrad in mid-August, demonstrating NATO’s ability to electronically jam Kaliningrad’s radar, radio, and air defense networks in the event of war.

Although NATO almost certainly has the capability to cut off access to Kaliningrad if an open war breaks out, Russia’s accusations of a current, unprovoked blockade during peacetime appear to be completely off the mark. It remains unclear whether these accusations are part of a strategy of “information confrontation” and to what extent they reflect actual threat perceptions in Moscow.
Risk of Misjudgment

It is becoming increasingly difficult for Western countries to continue escalating their support for Ukraine without ending up in direct confrontation with Moscow. Russia’s memo may indicate that hardliners in Moscow are gaining increasing influence in the debate over how to respond to Western measures, including arms deliveries to Kyiv, new sanctions against Moscow, the seizure of Russian ships, frequent military exercises, and intelligence flights near Kaliningrad. Russia and Europe appear to be on a collision course, which calls for caution, better risk assessment on both sides, and immediate measures to strengthen trust and security.

1 Like

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-issues-nuclear-warning-nato-tensions-rise-baltic-2026-09-30/

2 Likes

The Little Book.

The Little Book – The Way home or face The Fire/Veien hjem eller møte ilden – has now been published in Norwegian

Daniel 12:4 But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words, and "seal" the Book (Rev. 5:1-5), [even] to the time of the end: many shall run to and fro, and [evil] knowledge (1 Tim. 6:20) shall be increased

Revelation 5:9 And they sung a New Song (Isa. 42:10), saying, Thou art worthy to take the Book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation

10:7 But in the days of the voice of the seventh angel, when he shall begin to sound, the mystery of God should be finished, as He hath declared to His servants the Prophets.

10:8 And the voice which I heard from heaven spoke unto me again, and said, Go [and] take the little book which is open in the hand of the angel which standeth upon the "sea" and upon the "earth".

10:9 And I went unto the angel, and said unto him, Give me the little book. And he said unto me, Take [it], and eat it up; and it shall make thy belly bitter, but it shall be in thy mouth as sweet as honey.

10:10 And I took the little book (white stone ch. 2:17) out of the angel's hand, and ate it up; and it was in my mouth sweet as honey: and as soon as I had eaten (digested) it, my belly was bitter Go [and] take the little book which is open in the hand of the angel which standeth upon the "sea" and upon the "earth".
10:9 And I went unto the angel, and said unto him, Give me the little book. And he said unto me, Take [it], and eat it up; and it shall make thy belly bitter, but it shall be in thy mouth as sweet as honey.
10:10 And I took the little book (white stone ch. 2:17) out of the angel's hand, and ate it up; and it was in my mouth sweet as honey: and as soon as I had eaten (digested) it, my belly was bitter.

“Jesus Christ said you cannot be saved unless you are born again as your spirit being, find out what that really means by digesting the hidden manna found in The Little Book
(Rev. 10:2).

2 Likes

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-russia-explore-gas-sale-europe-amid-ukraine-war-say-sources-2026-10-08/

Jared Kushner in talks regarding U.S. ownership stake in Russia's Nord Stream pipeline

The U.S. benefited from the destruction of the pipeline in 2022, when Germany was forced to purchase liquefied natural gas from the U.S. after losing its supply of cheap Russian gas

By The Cradle News Desk, October 8, 2026.

Washington and Moscow are holding talks to allow a U.S. investor to purchase a stake in the Nord Stream gas pipelines, which run from Russia to Germany, Reuters reported on October 8.

U.S. Special Envoy Jared Kushner met with Kirill Dmitriev, an adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, to discuss the matter, five people familiar with the situation told the British news agency.

Such an agreement would allow U.S. investors to profit from Russian energy flows to Europe once the war in Ukraine is over.

Nord Stream, a system of giant pipelines that transports natural gas directly from Russia to Europe via the Baltic Sea, was sabotaged in September 2022, several months after the start of the war between Russia and Ukraine.

A massive explosion destroyed three of the four pipelines in the system, cutting Germany off from much of the cheap natural gas on which its industrialized economy depended.

Berlin largely replaced lost Russian supplies with more expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S.

Germany, Europe’s largest energy consumer, strongly supports Ukraine and opposes restoring its own access to cheap Russian gas.

“This threatens to become a dirty deal that will cost Europe dearly,” said Michael Kellner, a German lawmaker.

“The Americans and Russians will split the profits,” he added.

A White House official said that any agreements must be negotiated between Russia and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Treasury Department.

Nord Stream remains subject to sanctions from the U.S. and the EU.

“There is one pipe left of Nord Stream 2; it’s not damaged and can carry 27.5 trillion cubic meters of gas. There is only one decision the German government could make to reduce energy costs—we turn on the tap—but Washington decides and says no.”

—Vladimir Putin https://t.co/mtTCYndvXB pic.twitter.com/pmygOuWpvc
— Richard (@ricwe123) September 10, 2026

A U.S. official said that President Donald Trump, Kushner’s father-in-law, could waive or ease the sanctions to allow a deal to move forward.

Trump, however, may face obstacles if Democrats win control of Congress in the November midterm elections.

The company that controls the pipelines is 51 percent owned by the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom. Two German entities own an additional 31 percent, and a French and a Dutch firm own the remainder.

Kushner and Dmitriev have also discussed the sale of European oil refineries and gas stations owned by the Russian company Lukoil, two other people told Reuters.

The Trump administration imposed sweeping blocking sanctions against Lukoil and another Russian energy company, Rosneft, in October 2025, to target Russia’s oil revenues amid the war in Ukraine.

U.S. sanctions have made it difficult for both companies to operate in the EU, giving them an incentive to sell their European assets.

A consortium consisting of the DFC and investors from Qatar and the UAE will purchase Lukoil’s European assets, while U.S. authorities will lift the sanctions, the two people said.

“As for Lukoil, Steve (Witkoff) and Jared (Kushner) worked with DFC to negotiate a significant upfront payment and profit for the U.S.,” said a White House official.

A few weeks before the Russian invasion in February 2022, then-U.S. President Joe Biden promised to “put an end” to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

“If Russia invades—meaning tanks or troops crossing the border into Ukraine again—then there will no longer be a Nord Stream 2. We will put an end to it,” Biden stated during a joint press conference with then-German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

When Biden was asked how, the president replied, “I promise you, we will do it.”

1 Like
1 Like

Dear Western Men

Those of you who watch videos of Ukrainian men being forcibly dragged into military service, and who then have the audacity to shame them for screaming, resisting, and fighting back—all because they refuse to die for Zelenskyy’s next gold toilet, Pinchuk’s next luxury yacht, or Rheinmetall’s next quarterly profit.

Do you really understand which side you’re taking?

In the confrontation between the individual and the state, you’re siding with the state—a state that claims the right to take a human life that it never granted in the first place.

Would you be just as eager to defend this power if it were your own government dragging you away?
If it were your own son, brother, or father screaming for his freedom?

Would you still be lecturing him on duty and patriotism, while manhunters forced him into a war he never chose?

At what point did the interests of an artificial, deeply corrupt political construct—controlled by a greedy, ruling mafia—become more sacred than human life itself?

At what point did obedience to the state become a higher moral virtue than a person’s fundamental right to live?

And when did defending human rights become something to be ashamed of—while defending the state’s power to take lives was considered a righteous act?

Germany is promoting Nazism in Ukraine—what an irony

Yes, precisely this Azov exhibition—with its deeply controversial far-right roots and its glorification of the Waffen-SS “Galizien” Division.

It was Marina Mirzayeva herself (pictured wearing a uniform) who curated the exhibition in Kyiv that glorified the Waffen-SS “Galizien” division—an exhibition that was actively promoted by the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture.

I publicly criticized this in my capacity as a Holocaust scholar, and because I spoke out against this glorification of the SS, I received death threats from neo-Nazis and their sympathizers.

Let me also remind you that the Third Assault Brigade is a formation whose ideological legacy can be traced back to the “integral nationalism” of the OUN and UPA—movements that were involved in the Holocaust and the mass murder of Poles.

And let’s not forget the openly neo-Nazi figures in the brigade’s leadership, including individuals known by the call signs “Martyn,” “Uragan,” and “Kolovrat.”

It appears that Germany has discovered a new and “exciting” arena in cultural diplomacy: whitewashing neo-Nazis through literature, photo shoots, and the prestigious Goethe-Institut.

From Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) to Vergangenheitsverdrängung (repression of the past)—from confronting the Nazi past to conveniently looking the other way.

“Never again”? Well, that clearly depends on who’s on the guest list.

German cultural diplomacy. Now with a rather unfortunate historical aftertaste.

1 Like

National Security
Sweden Establishes New Air Defense Unit on Gotland

Sweden is stepping up its air defense capabilities on Gotland. Defense against drones will be a key part of this effort.

Sweden is stepping up its military presence on Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Starting July 1, 2027, the island will have its own unit under the Lv 6 Air Defense Regiment in Halmstad.

The goal is to train more soldiers and strengthen readiness on the island, which plays a central role in NATO’s defense of the Baltic Sea region.

The Swedish Armed Forces announced this in a press release on Wednesday, October 21.

“The security situation requires capacity here and now, while we continue to adapt. This applies to the Army in general and Gotland in particular,” said Johan Pekkari, Chief of the Swedish Army.

Plans to Quadruple Training

Gotland’s P 18 Regiment has already begun training air defense soldiers with support from personnel in Halmstad. The new unit is set to take over responsibility next summer, before operations are expanded further in 2028.

Initially, 30 conscripts will be trained. The goal is to increase that number to 120 over the next few years, according to SVT.

“This goes hand in hand with our need to grow and the need for more air defense on Gotland,” Sofia Westermark, commander of the air defense regiment, told SVT.

Initially, personnel from Halmstad will staff the unit. In the long term, the plan is to establish a permanent base with personnel residing on the island.

To Protect Against Drones

A key objective of this initiative is to strengthen the ability to counter drones.

Among other things, soldiers will receive training in air defense to protect critical infrastructure against attacks from the air.

The ability to counter small and medium-sized drones will be particularly important.

Experience from the war in Ukraine has shown how crucial air defense is for conducting military operations on the ground, Westermark emphasized to SVT.

Read also: Norway skips NATO exercise
Arming a NATO island

Gotland is centrally located in the Baltic Sea, about 300 kilometers from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The island’s strategic location makes it crucial to NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic states and Scandinavia in a potential conflict with Russia.

As ABC News reported in June, Sweden has already carried out an extensive military buildup on Gotland.

Over two billion kroner has been invested in military infrastructure, air defense capabilities have been reinstated, and the island has been equipped with a regiment of CV90 armored vehicles and Leopard 2 main battle tanks.

During the Cold War, Sweden had thousands of soldiers on Gotland, buWeaknesses in Drone Defense Exposed

In May, approximately 18,000 soldiers from 13 countries participated in a major military exercise in Sweden, with Gotland at its center.

Ukrainian drone operators also took part in the exercise, demonstrating how effectively modern drones can neutralize military units.

The exercise illustrated the challenges Western forces face in light of the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

Counter-drone operations are now becoming a key part of the ongoing expansion of air defense on Gotland.

“Gotland’s strategic location and importance to NATO’s defense in the Baltic Sea region cannot be overstated,” says Andreas Gustafsson, commander of the Gotland Regiment.

He emphasizes that strong air defense is crucial for defending the island and its population.t the military presence was later drastically reduced. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the buildup has accelerated.

Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024 has further reinforced the island’s importance.