Give Peace a Chance

[NancyDrewberry]

41. Russia has initiated the development of important multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation arrangements, including on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and on the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism. We believe that a constructive dialogue on these issues will provide an opportunity to engage in substantive work (including negotiations) at the UN. In promoting these initiatives, we rigorously adhere to the principles of equality and consensus ensuring a balance of interests.

At the 78th session of the General Assembly, we will traditionally submit to the First Committee draft resolutions concerning no first placement of weapons in outer space (NFP), transparency and confidence-building measures in space activities, and further practical steps on PAROS. Globalization of the NFP initiative is a significant but only interim step towards the conclusion of an international treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space on the basis of the Chinese-Russian draft treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

42. As regards the international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, we are convinced of the indisputable nature of the central and coordinating role of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). We view as counterproductive the attempts to erode the COPUOS mandate by artificially transferring the issues of space debris and orbital traffic management from its agenda to parallel and purely disarmament-related UN platforms in line with the concept of the so‑called responsible behaviour in outer space.

We believe it is important to adopt, by consensus, the resolution entitled "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space", which approves the report of the 66th session of COPUOS. We view as dangerous potential attempts to open the draft resolution traditionally adopted without a vote for revision, yielding to political considerations.

We continue to advocate for legal certainty in the matters of delimitation of outer space and airspace, including in the context of establishing the spatial limits to states' sovereignty over their territory and ensuring their national security, and for creating the environment enabling long-term sustainability of aviation activities and safety. We call for creation of an effective orbital traffic management system on the basis of regulation and monitoring through a legally binding code of conduct to be developed by the international community.

43. We support the strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

We are gravely concerned over the growing tendency of Euro-Atlantic allies, led by the United States, to "privatize" specialized international organizations, of which the unacceptable situation in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is a graphic example.

Since 2018, in the vein of the anti-Russian and anti-Syrian rhetoric, NATO and EU countries have completely abandoned the practice of attaining consensus on key issues on the OPCW's agenda, as enshrined in Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and replaced it with voting on the basis of bloc discipline. These consistent efforts resulted in vesting the Technical Secretariat (TS) with "attribution" functions in violation of the CWC-established procedure for introducing amendments to the Convention (Article XV). While pursuing its goal of toppling the legitimate government of Bashar al-Assad, undesirable for Washington, the "collective West" has virtually undermined the integrity of the Convention and ruined the technical nature of the OPCW's work.

44. We attach great importance to UNSC resolution 1540 as one of the fundamental international instruments in the area of non-proliferation aimed at preventing the WMD and WMD-related materials from falling into the hands of non-state actors. We expect this UN forum to continue working in the spirit of cooperation.

45. As regards the situation in Ukraine, we are deeply concerned that the Western countries undermine global efforts to combat illicit arms diversion and violate their arms control obligations. The unrestrained "pumping" of weapons into the Kiev regime by NATO Member States, which openly acknowledge the lack of capabilities to trace their further movement, is sharply exacerbating the risk of these weapons, including particularly sensitive ones, falling into the hands of criminal organizations and terrorist groups, as well as their uncontrolled proliferation in Europe and worldwide.

46. We support establishing a specialized universal organization under the auspices of the UN to address the full range of issues of combating maritime crime in different regions.

We continue to work actively with our partners in the Horn of Africa, including in the forum of the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities.

We note that we share approaches to the problem of combating piracy and commitment to maintaining and further developing the Contact Group.

As the number of piracy attacks and armed robberies against ships off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea is growing on an annual basis, Russia is committed to further participating in the activities of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum, a useful format for expert cooperation and coordination of anti-piracy operations.

We take note of the work of the Global Maritime Crime Programme under the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). We intend to expand the financial assistance to coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea from the annual voluntary contribution of the Russian Federation to UNODC with a view to enhancing the operational effectiveness and technical capabilities of regional maritime forces.

47. As regards the law of the sea, we consider it essential to preserve the integrity of the regulatory framework established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other fundamental instruments in this area. New processes, including the agreement on marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction adopted in June 2023 and its system of global bodies, should not prejudice the provisions of existing universal and regional treaties, or mandates of competent intergovernmental organizations.

We are committed to the effective functioning of the bodies established under the 1982 Convention, i.e. the International Seabed Authority, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. We believe that the said bodies should act strictly within the framework of their mandates under the Convention, avoiding any broad interpretation of their powers or politicization of their decisions.

48. Russia expects the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to perform the functions entrusted to it by the UN Charter in an effective and unbiased manner, including in the disputes involving Russia, particularly those concerning the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Russian side has presented legally and factually flawless arguments on the absence of any sort of "terrorism" in Donbass and "racial discrimination" in Crimea, as well as the Court's lack of jurisdiction over Ukraine's speculative accusations of alleged "misuse" of the Genocide Convention by Russia. As the Court itself earlier acknowledged, the Convention does not cover the issues of the use of force — especially in the case of exercising the right to self-defence guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Court's work is complicated by an unprecedented political pressure exerted by the West, including by the avalanche-like involvement of NATO countries into the dispute concerning the Genocide Convention as "third parties". Russian lawyers, witnesses and experts at the ICJ receive death threats, get included in "Ukraine's enemies' kill list" on the "Mirotvorets" website. In these circumstances the Court must make the right choice in favour of justice, otherwise the entire system of international justice will be jeopardized.

49. We closely follow the work of the UN International Law Commission, which traditionally makes a significant contribution to the codification and progressive development of international law. In the UNGA Sixth Committee, we promote Russian doctrinal approaches in the area of international law, including for developing universal conventions on the issues ripe for codification.

50. Over the past year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) fully demonstrated itself to be a puppet and corrupt organization. The activities of this body, which has no relation to the UN, no longer allow referring to it as an international criminal justice institution. We expect states, when considering cooperation with the ICC, to fully comply with the generally accepted norms of international law regarding the immunity of state officials.

51. We stress the provisional nature and strictly limited mandate of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), as well as the need for its speedy closing. The IRMCT has "inherited" the worst practices of its predecessors, especially the ICTY, consistently demonstrating an anti-Serbian bias.

We still believe it unacceptable that international organizations are granted the power to investigate alleged internationally wrongful acts and "attribute" responsibility to the states that did not explicitly consent to that, or act outside the scope of their competence in general.

"International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in Syria since March 2011" established by the UNGA in excess of its powers is illegitimate and its "decisions" are legally null and void.

52. The issue of "the rule of law" should be considered with an emphasis on its international dimension. Attempts to use the "rule of law" to interfere in national legal systems must also be opposed. We assume that the extraterritorial application of national legislation to the detriment of the sovereignty of other states is a negative factor in international relations.

53. The Russian Federation has consistently called on all states to build human rights cooperation based on the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, and to work together to develop a constructive, equal and respectful dialogue on human rights.

The Russian Federation has presented its candidacy for re-election to the HRC in the elections to be held in October 2023 at the 78th session of the UNGA. If elected, we will continue to build a constructive, equal and respectful dialogue on human rights. We count on the support of our partners in these elections.

We believe that the primary responsibility for the protection of human rights rests with states, with the executive bodies of the UN playing an auxiliary role. We are convinced that all categories of human rights — civil and political, economic, social and cultural — have equal weight and value.

We are convinced that integration of the human rights agenda into all areas of UN activity is counterproductive and must not lead to duplication of the work of the UN's main organs. We do not support linking the activities of the HRC and the UNSC.

We strongly oppose the idea nurtured by the Bureau of the UNGA's Third Committee to "split up" its sessions into main and resumed ones. We regard such actions as unacceptable and arbitrary.

We will oppose the adoption of politicized country resolutions to suit the political priorities of individual countries. It is in this light that we view the resolution on the human rights situation in Crimea, which Ukraine's delegation has been regularly submitting for consideration by the UNGA's Third Committee since 2016. The document has nothing to do with the actual situation in that region of the Russian Federation and is being used to disseminate anti-Russian propaganda within the UN.

As regards the work of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), it is necessary to enhance its transparency and accountability to the UN Member States in order to avoid politicization and biased approaches when assessing the human rights situation in different countries.

It is unacceptable that the OHCHR continues to ignore the materials regularly sent by the Russian side and describing the crimes committed by the Kiev regime and the atrocities perpetrated by Ukrainian militants and foreign mercenaries in Donbass and other Russian regions. The OHCHR fails to notice the manifestations of neo-Nazism in Ukraine, persecution of canonical Orthodoxy, bans on the activities of opposition parties and movements, arrests and torture of opposition and human rights activists and public figures. The Office is deaf to the hate speech by Ukrainian officials calling for extermination of the Russian-speaking population, including children, persecution of Russian journalists, and abuse of captured Russian soldiers. At the same time, the OHCHR turns a blind eye to rampant Russophobia unleashed in Western countries, and to the banning of more than a hundred media outlets throughout Europe and Ukraine. The supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine by Western countries is not in any way condemned.

54. We strongly condemn any forms and manifestations of discrimination. The ban on discrimination enshrined in international human rights treaties is universal and applies to all people without exception. We see no added value in singling out new vulnerable groups (e.g. the LGBT community, human rights activists, Internet bloggers) that allegedly require special legal protection, or creating new categories of rights. Such moves by a number of countries lead to increased politicization and confrontation in the work of UN human rights mechanisms.

55. As regards social development, we support the efforts of the international community to implement practical measures to eradicate poverty, promote social integration, and ensure full employment and decent work for all. We believe that this area of activity contributes to the progressive implementation of the decisions of the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) and the 24th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We oppose attempts to abolish the UN Commission for Social Development, which is the main coordinating body within the UN system for ensuring equal opportunities for persons with disabilities, supporting older persons, improving the situation of youth and strengthening the role of the traditional family. We are convinced that it is at this intergovernmental forum that the initiative of the UN Secretary-General to hold the World Social Summit in 2025 should be discussed.

56. We advocate a balanced integration of gender equality and women's advancement issues in the work of the UN system, without taking them to extremes and where appropriate. We are convinced that the UN Commission on the Status of Women remains the key intergovernmental forum for constructive dialogue on the full range of issues related to the advancement of women, in the spirit of the decisions of the 4th World Conference on Women and the 23rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

We believe that the work of UN Women must be guided by its mandate, including regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Strategic Plan 2022–2025, which has not been agreed upon at the intergovernmental level. We consider the assistance of UN Women "on the ground" to be effective only when such activities are carried out at the request and with the consent of the states concerned.

57. We advocate strengthening international cooperation in the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, taking into account the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the outcome document of the 27th special session of the UNGA entitled "A World Fit for Children", which proclaimed, in particular, the need for a family environment for the full and harmonious development of a child's personality. We note the importance of the right of parents and/or legal guardians to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of his/her rights.

We pay close attention to the problem of children in armed conflict, including within the framework of the UNSC. We strongly condemn the United Nations Secretary-General's biased decision to include the Russian Armed Forces in the list of parties responsible for violations against children in Ukraine in his relevant annual report for 2022. We believe that the list of violators should include the Ukrainian armed forces, which have committed numerous crimes against minors.

We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and look forward to further cooperation with her. We encourage the Special Representative to use only verified facts when it comes to the situation of children in Ukraine, avoiding politicization of the issue.

58. We support the discussion at the UN of the problems of interreligious and intercultural interaction and the development of intercivilizational dialogue, particularly within the framework of the Alliance of Civilizations. We regard the building of a culture of peace as an essential prerequisite for peaceful coexistence and global cooperation for the sake of peace and development.

59. We are ready to cooperate with all interested relevant non-governmental organizations on issues on the UN agenda. We support adequate representation of the Russian non-governmental community in the work of the relevant segments, bodies and entities of the UN system.

60. It is worth being careful about using the concept of a "multi-stakeholder" approach, which is widely used in UN documents and is one of the key elements of Secretary-General Guterres's report on "Our Common Agenda". It is our belief that the involvement of non-state actors in the work of the UN should not prejudice its intergovernmental nature.

61. The Russian Federation believes that overcoming the consequences of the migration crises that have affected individual countries and entire regions of the world requires coordination of efforts across all states. It is necessary to develop multilateral cooperation in this area with the UN playing a central coordinating role in order to effectively address the challenges associated with the mass movement of large groups of refugees and migrants.

We believe that approaches to overcoming migration challenges, including the issues of ensuring and protecting the rights of refugees, cannot contradict the basic principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and that measures taken must not violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and must not be implemented without the consent of the countries where they are implemented. We are convinced that the solution to this problem should rely on the political settlement in the countries of origin of migrants, as well as on assisting them in socio-economic development, state-building and fight against terrorism.

The Russian Federation makes a significant contribution to strengthening the international refugee protection regime and resolving migration problems, which is manifested in large-scale humanitarian activities in many countries and regions of the world, as well as political efforts to prevent and overcome crises. Еvery year, for example, Russia voluntarily contributes 2 million US dollars to the budget of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

We commend UNHCR's role in enhancing the efficiency of international protection for refugees and other categories of persons under its responsibility. We consider the Office's work to be particularly important in situations of major humanitarian crises and view it as a significant element of comprehensive measures to resolve such crises.

Over 5 million residents of the DPR, LPR, the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, as well as Ukraine have urgently arrived in safe Russian regions since February 2022. The Russian Federation is making every effort to receive and accommodate these persons, and to provide them with comprehensive assistance.

We believe it necessary for the UNHCR to pay increased attention to stateless persons, including in Europe.

We intend to work constructively in the run-up to the second Global Forum on Refugees scheduled for December 2023, which will help to attract even greater global attention to the important refugee issue and enhance efforts to implement the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Legal Migration.

62. The annual Georgia-sponsored UNGA resolution on the status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia is clearly counterproductive. It has the potential to complicate the situation in the region and stall the International Geneva discussions on stability and security in Transcaucasia, which remain the only dialogue format for representatives of Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia.

63. We are concerned over the extreme politicization of UNESCO and the total "Ukrainization" of its work. The imposition by Western countries on UNESCO of issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty that lie outside its mandate, as well as the promotion therein of non-inclusive initiatives in the spirit of the notorious "rule-based order" compromise its international credibility and are detrimental to its effectiveness. We insist on the need for greater budgetary discipline and strict compliance by the Secretariat and Member States with UNESCO's statutory provisions.

64. We are concerned about the extreme politicization of the humanitarian sphere, attempts to discriminate against and discredit cultural figures, introduction of unilateral restrictive measures on ethnic grounds, and dismantling of monuments associated with cultural heritage. We are outraged by rampant Russophobia in the countries of the "collective West", "derussification" of works of art and cancellation of Russian culture.

65. We are convinced that sport is a unique tool for developing and strengthening social ties, building mutually respectful communication, and should bring closer together and unite peoples. We are unwaveringly committed to the development of equal international sports cooperation that fully complies with the spirit and principles of Olympism, which precludes politicization and biased approach. We find it unacceptable when certain Western countries use sport for their self-serving purposes. Persistent attempts to politicize sports cooperation, put pressure on the relevant multilateral organizations, including the International Olympic Committee, and cause division in the international Olympic movement are at odds with the Olympic goals and ideals.

We insist on holding fair and just competitions, and ensuring that all countries without exception have equal access to full participation in the Olympic and Paralympic movements.

66. We call for an immediate abolition of politically motivated censorship of Russian and Russian-language media by the authorities of the states of the "collective West", Ukraine and Moldova, as well as major IT corporations. We insist on putting an end to repressions against undesirable journalists and public figures. We are deeply concerned over the lack of reaction on the part of the relevant international organizations and United Nations bodies in connection with the deteriorating situation with freedom of expression in many countries of the world.

67. In the social and economic area, the Western countries' desire to blame Russia for the deepening economic crisis and to take advantage of the situation to exclude Russia and our like-minded countries from specialized formats of co-operation is particularly noticeable. Against this background, developing countries have become less hesitant to talk about the long-term (since the colonial period) economic damage caused by armed conflicts, unilateral coercive measures, environmental pollution, failed economic transformations with Western loans and aid, and, more recently, about the trend to curtail development assistance or reorient it for military or humanitarian purposes. Developing countries come to realize that sanctions as a form of hybrid warfare have global implications, affecting market volatility, access to food and energy resources, which are essential for social stability and economic development. Against the background of recession, it will be impossible to take effective practical steps to restore supply chains, ensure energy and food security, and prevent the degradation of global economic ties without Russia.

68. Despite the objective challenges faced, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda) remains fully relevant as a universally constructive and consolidating initiative. Discussions around individual aspects of the UN Secretary-General's reform initiative entitled "Our Common Agenda" should not overshadow the central role of the four-year High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) to be held in New York in September 2023 under the auspices of the UNGA. The Forum will focus on a midterm review of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, followed by a high-level dialogue on financing for development to review the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, which is an integral part of the 2030 Agenda. These intergovernmental agreements remain relevant in their entirety as a reference for national planning and targeted efforts by the UN development system.

We continue to view poverty reduction as the central objective of the UN's social and economic activities. We support further elaboration of practical steps in this area, including social, economic and technological transformation related to industrial capacity development, especially in the least developed countries, in the framework of the Third UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty.

69. We attach great importance to international cooperation in addressing climate change. We regard the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement as the main international legal mechanisms to achieve a durable solution to the climate issue. We consider it important to strictly adhere to the provisions of the Paris Agreement in terms of keeping the average global temperature increase within the range of 2–1.5° C and achieving carbon neutrality in the second half of the century rather than by 2050. We oppose the "blurring" of the mandate of the UNFCCC and the establishment of a system of treaty obligations duplicating it. The division of labour between environmental mechanisms should be respected while avoiding the creation of artificial overlaps making it harder to pursue common goals and interests.

We are convinced that climate action should build on non-discriminatory international cooperation with due regard for economic realities and interests of all the countries concerned.

We oppose linking climate and security agendas and vesting peacekeeping missions with unnatural climate-monitoring functions. By doing so, major donor states are seeking to shrug off the responsibility for economic problems faced by least developed countries.

70. As for energy cooperation, we deem it appropriate to prioritize the task of ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy (SDG 7), which should be implemented with due consideration for environmental factors.

Recognizing the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we advocate the principle of technological neutrality and non-discriminatory treatment of energy sources with comparable carbon footprint characteristics. We call for objective assessment of different types of energy resources (nuclear, hydro power, and all types of renewable energy) based on their environmental impact throughout their life cycle. In this context, we support expanding the use of natural gas as the most environmentally acceptable fossil fuel, as well as categorizing nuclear and hydro power as clean energy sources. At the same time, we believe that the processes of the replacement of coal-fired generation and phasing out of fossil fuel should progress in step with developing relevant economic and technological conditions.

We are convinced that the transition to low-emission development should be gradual, balanced, and carefully adjusted to national and regional specifics. The development of general, uniform and clear climate regulation rules will improve the effectiveness of joint efforts.

At the same time, we note the fundamental importance of protecting critical infrastructure, including in accordance with UNSC resolution 2341. In this context, we once again call for an open and transparent international investigation into the terrorist attack against the Nord Stream pipeline system in September 2022.

71. We continue to advocate adherence to the basic principles of international humanitarian assistance enshrined in UNGA resolution 46/182 as well as other General Assembly and ECOSOC decisions. We encourage increasing the expediency and efficiency of such assistance. We call on the UN humanitarian agencies to build their work on carefully verified data on the humanitarian situation "on the ground."

72. Lifting all unilateral coercive measures running counter to the UN Charter and international law would make a decisive contribution to achieving the SDGs and addressing the global crisis. Such unilateral coercive measures have serious humanitarian implications as they block assistance to those in need and supply of basic goods, including food products, fertilizers, fuel and lubricants, and medicines, as well as hamper the use of international investments for economic recovery and undermine multilateral efforts to address the consequences of the COVID‑19 pandemic.

The tendency to apply extraterritorial economic restrictions (so-called secondary sanctions) is of particular concern. The principle of responsibility of "third" countries, their authorities, citizens and businesses for maintaining and developing mutually beneficial trade and economic ties with those against whom unilateral restrictive actions have been imposed has been introduced in interstate relations. This virtually amounts to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and neo-colonial coercion to comply with others' illegal sanctions by exerting direct pressure on the social and political circles of the target countries.

73. The Russian Federation shares the calls of the UN leadership for reforming the global financial architecture, which in its current form contributes to the preservation of Western countries' dominance in the world economy and to the increase in the debt burden of developing countries, as well as impedes free and non-discriminatory access to international capital markets. We support initiatives to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions and to ensure broader representation of developing countries and economies in transition in their capital and governing bodies. We regret that the UN Secretary-General does not sufficiently promote scientific cooperation and, above all, technology transfer.

Illicit financial flows from developing countries, which are de facto exploited as a source of financing for Western economies, should be returned to their countries of origin, including through the development of a new multilateral instrument on asset recovery to complement the Convention against Corruption.

74. We advocate further enhancing of the effectiveness of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) in implementing the UN SDGs. We emphasize the need to counter the policy pursued by some Western countries to politicize these programmes and dilute their technical mandates.

The outcome of the second session of the UN-Habitat Assembly highlighted the relevance of the Programme as a leading UN intergovernmental platform for equal engagement of states in sustainable urban development and the implementation of the New Urban Agenda adopted in 2016 at the third UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Quito, Ecuador). We call for a non-discriminatory approach to countries where UN-Habitat works on conflict and natural disasters.

UNEP's key objective is to improve the effectiveness of international environmental cooperation. We note that it is inadmissible to prioritize the environmental dimension of sustainable development to the detriment of its economic and social aspects. We oppose the discussion of peace and security, human rights and humanitarian operations within the framework of UNEP.

We deem it necessary to promote equitable geographical representation in the professional composition of the Secretariat in accordance with resolution 5/13 adopted at the fifth session of the UN Environment Assembly.

75. We note the need to uphold the central role of the Rome-based international organizations — the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations World Food Programme and the International Fund for Agricultural Development — in coordinating international efforts to strengthen global food security, eliminate hunger, improve nutrition, and ensure sustainable agriculture and rural development. We are actively engaged in the follow-up to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit to transform food systems. We assume that the transformation of international food systems should take into account national priorities and specific circumstances.

We oppose Western countries' attempts to hold Russia responsible for the global food crisis. In our contacts with friendly states and within various international fora, we endeavour to explain the real consequences and impact of the unilateral restrictions imposed against us. We consider it crucial to prevent the politicization of international cooperation in the agrifood sector and the provision of humanitarian assistance, as well as the instrumentalization of the anti-famine agenda for commercial, economic and geopolitical purposes. We pay particular attention to ensuring stable and uninterrupted food supply chains and correcting distortions in the fertilizer market, primarily for the benefit of those in need in developing countries.

76. In protecting public health, we support the actions agreed in the UNGA and WHO to achieve universal health coverage (UHC), including in preparation for the three high-level meetings of the UN General Assembly to be held in September 2023 — on pandemics (20 September), UHC (21 September) and tuberculosis (22 September) — with a focus on primary health care. We are also interested in active participation in the multilateral efforts to curb the risks related to the spread of antimicrobial resistance. We will further contribute to the international partnership to fight against HIV/AIDS in strict compliance with the Russian legislation and in line with our national priorities in this area.

Today, preparedness, prevention and appropriate response to outbreaks of infectious diseases have become a key element of public health cooperation. We believe that the bulk of the professional work in this field should be managed by relevant WHO bodies with due consideration for the positions of Member States and unconditional respect for their national sovereignty.

77. We consistently support the WHO as the key player in international global health cooperation. We advocate improving the effectiveness of the Organization's activities through greater transparency and accountability to Member States. We believe that the bulk of the professional work in this field should be moderated by relevant WHO bodies with due consideration for the positions of Member States and unconditional respect for their national sovereignty. We oppose the establishment of exclusive parallel structures in this area as well as the attempts to substitute them for universal global health mechanisms of the United Nations.

78. We are committed to further development of the multilateral partnership for disaster risk reduction, including project activities and experience sharing among relevant agencies under the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030.

79. As for the reform of the United Nations development system (UNDS), we intend to promote the strengthening of the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) system and to maintain their focus on sustainable development issues. We consider it counterproductive to transfer funding for the UN RC system to the regular budget of the United Nations or to increase the coordination fee on earmarked contributions from Member States for development assistance projects from 1 to 2 per cent. We intend to promote greater accountability of UNDS funds, programmes and special agencies to Member States, implementation of their project and regulatory activities based on national priorities of the recipient countries, and stronger regional cooperation platforms with a focus on the growing role of regional economic commissions.

80. We consistently advocate curbing the growth of the regular and peacekeeping budgets, as well as of the financial estimates for the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. We insist on reasonable reductions in requested resources.

We support the proper implementation by the UN Secretariat of the recommendations of oversight bodies. We consistently advocate greater accountability, transparency and internal oversight in the Secretariat's activities. We attach great importance to preserving Member States' effective levers of control over the financial and human resources of the United Nations. We believe that any reforms and transformations in the administrative and budgetary area should be carried out exclusively on the basis of the UNGA-approved mandates.

We view the UNGA as the main platform to elaborate system-wide solutions in the field of human resources management and establish the conditions of service for staff based on recommendations of the International Civil Service Commission.

81. Ensuring parity among the six official UN languages in conference services and information and communication activities remains a priority for our delegation. In this regard, the necessary resources for the Organization's language services should be guaranteed. The principle of multilingualism should be of key importance in the planning and implementation of all UN projects, including in the media and social networks. Any manifestations of discrimination against the Russian language in the UN system are unacceptable.

We prioritize countering disinformation and maintaining an objective and balanced approach in the work of the Organization's media. We are interested in a comprehensive expansion of contacts and development of partnerships between the UN Department of Global Communications and Russian media outlets.